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HISPANOS AND THE CIVIL WAR IN NEW MEXICO: A RECONSIDERATION

DARLIS A. MILLER

IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CIVIL WAR, it was clear to leaders of the Confederate States of America that New Mexico would have to be seized by force to insure economic outlets on the West Coast. This territory was viewed by the rebels as the key to Pacific expansion. Most western historians recognize the important role that New Mexico played in preventing the Confederacy from establishing a sea-to-sea empire, but scholars traditionally have slighted native New Mexicans, except perhaps to attribute the major Union defeat at Valverde to their alleged cowardliness.¹

To offset past omissions, this paper will stress Hispanic contributions to New Mexico's war effort as well as the impact that the Civil War had on the lives of Hispanos. Furthermore, to understand more clearly the quality of interaction among ethnic groups in the Southwest, this paper—to a modest extent—will focus upon Hispanic-Anglo relations during the war years.²

In 1861 New Mexico had a population, exclusive of Indians, of approximately 80,000, the great bulk of whom were natives of Hispanic descent.³ It was a highly stratified society in which a small wealthy Hispanic class (*ricos*) shared social, economic, and political power with the wealthier and more talented members within the Anglo community. Most New Mexicans were illiterate and poor (*pobres*), subsisting in small rural villages or working on large ranches. Many were held in debt peonage which meant virtual labor for life to a wealthy land owner.⁴

Because of Indian hostilities, New Mexico was garrisoned by a relatively large number of United States troops—2,466—who were widely scattered among nine major military posts.⁵ After the surrender of Fort Sumter, Union officials ordered regular soldiers

to proceed east to the battlefield, leaving territorial defense to volunteer soldiers and militiamen.

This movement east was later delayed, but it soon became apparent that to prevent the Southern Confederacy from overrunning the Southwest the Union army needed the support and goodwill of the Hispanic population, a people who had been citizens of the United States for less than fifteen years. During the war the Hispanos provided both manpower and supplies to the Northern war effort, but initially Union officials voiced conflicting opinions concerning their loyalty and military efficiency.

In April and May 1861, Governor Abraham Rencher assured Secretary of State William Seward that everything was quiet and tranquil in the territory; the people were attached to the Union and secession had caused little excitement. Moreover, Rencher stated, New Mexicans were more concerned about being protected from Indians than being involved in events in the eastern United States.⁶ Henry Connelly, who succeeded Rencher as governor, continually emphasized his belief that native New Mexicans would remain loyal.⁷ On the other hand, Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, who assumed command of the Military Department of New Mexico in June 1861, viewed Hispanos as apathetic and expressed little faith in their military competency. According to Canby, New Mexicans could not furnish a reliable force to resist invasion by Confederate troops but they could be used as Indian fighters or as auxiliary soldiers to support the regular army. Canby's opinion of native New Mexicans declined even further as the Confederacy mounted its invasion of New Mexico. Prior to the battle at Valverde, for example, Canby reported that the "Mexican" people had "no affection for the institutions of the United States" and, indeed, exhibited hatred for Americans.⁸

Although Hispanic residents throughout the territory publicly declared their loyalty to the United States,⁹ such declarations failed to allay fears among some Anglo residents that Hispanos planned to stage an uprising and overthrow the Anglo power structure. An officer stationed in Albuquerque reported, for example, that the "Mexican" population planned on June 7, 1861 to rise and cut the throats of all "white men" in the territory. Allegedly, this movement was to start simultaneously at Taos in the north and El Paso in the south.¹⁰

Nothing of this sort occurred. But residents of Mesilla in southern New Mexico declared for the Confederacy and in July 1861 welcomed the occupation of that town by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Baylor and his Texas Mounted Rifles. It should be emphasized, however, that support in this region for Baylor and the Confederacy came largely from the Anglo community, although a small number of Hispanos joined Baylor's army and two were appointed officers in his newly created Confederate Territory of Arizona.¹¹

Prior to the invasion of New Mexico by the Texas rebels, Colonel Canby initiated plans to raise two regiments of volunteers among the territory's citizenry, but recruitment progressed so slowly that Canby told his superiors that the people of New Mexico had greater concern for private and petty interests than in defending the territory.¹² To stimulate enlistments, the Colonel sent influential Hispanos to recruit in rural villages and allowed families of virtually destitute enlistees to purchase rations from the commissary.¹³ Special concessions had to be made for Hispanic families because, as one recruiter stated, "[the men] will not enlist readily unless they know that their families are cared for."¹⁴

Although some individuals, such as Ceran St. Vrain, attributed the difficulty in recruiting to Texas agents, probably the greatest single handicap in the early months was lack of funds to pay recruits.¹⁵ An Albuquerque recruiter stated that no one in his town would enlist unless the government showed good faith by paying those who had already completed three-month enlistments. In November 1861 Canby complained that lack of funds had almost put an end to raising volunteers.¹⁶

Yet despite initial hesitancy, approximately 2,800 residents—most of them Hispanos—had enlisted in the New Mexico volunteers by February 1862.¹⁷ Undoubtedly these men joined the army for mixed reasons, but for many the chief attraction was the prospect of soldier's pay and bounties. During most of the war privates were paid thirteen dollars a month, and men enlisting for three years were given a bounty of one hundred dollars, one quarter of which was paid in advance. The local press as well as recruiting agents continually stressed the fact that laborers received better pay in the volunteers than they could by working for wages.¹⁸ The pay scale, in fact, appeared so attractive to civilian teamsters that

they threatened to leave employment with the quartermaster's department to join the volunteers.¹⁹

Furthermore, military service was one way to escape peonage. Soon after taking command, Canby issued a circular stating that enlisted men could not be discharged because of past indebtedness and that petitions to reclaim peons had to be filed with United States District courts. The Santa Fe *New Mexican* subsequently reported that large numbers of peons had "extricated themselves from their thralldom as servants by going into the United States Volunteer regiments."²⁰ But the question of peonage plagued military officers throughout the war years. The institution was protected by territorial law, and Canby's orders were on occasion ignored by county judges who arrested soldiers for debt under the peonage act.²¹ Although the flow of peons into the volunteers continued, the military apparently grew tired of legal harassment and one of Canby's officers issued a cryptic command in September 1863 that "no peon will be enlisted without the consent of his master." By the close of the Civil War, disgruntled citizens alternately charged that military officers aided masters in, and prevented them from, reclaiming peons.²²

Patriotism undoubtedly motivated many Hispanos to fight for the Union cause. Early New Mexican historians, such as Ralph Emerson Twitchell and L. Bradford Prince, believed that the large numbers of Hispanos volunteering for service testified to their patriotic sentiment. Personal testimonies of New Mexico volunteers are few, but among those who recorded their reasons for enlisting was Captain Rafael Chacon, who, in typical patriotic rhetoric, stated that he took up arms "filled with the most sincere patriotism . . . in defense of the just cause of Union and Freedom."²³

For the masses, however, hatred for Texans cemented loyalties to the federal government. The Texan "invasion" of New Mexico territory in 1841 bequeathed a legacy of bitterness and hatred. Thereafter *Tejano* became a detested word, and mothers in New Mexico disciplined children with the threat "if you are not good, I'll give you to the *Tejanos*, who are coming back."²⁴ Governor Connelly and Hispanic politicians capitalized on this hatred to encourage support for the war effort. In his proclamation ordering

the organization of the militia, Connelly warned the people that the territory had again been invaded by Texans and that their "manhood" called upon them to defend their homes, their families, and the soil of their birth. In later years, native New Mexicans referred to this most bitter of all American wars as "the War with the Texans."²⁵

The majority of Hispanos who joined the volunteers had no previous formal military training, although undoubtedly a large number had defended communities against Indian attacks or accompanied volunteer units on Indian campaigns.²⁶ Officers came from the *rico* class; enlisted men occupied a more humble status. Upon enlisting, they most frequently listed their occupation as "laborer," but others classified themselves as herders, farmers, shoemakers, teamsters, carpenters, silversmiths, tailors, and even musicians. Most Hispanos listed their birthplace as New Mexico, but a surprisingly large number were born in the nearby Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora. Generally the volunteers ranged in age from eighteen to forty-five; the majority were in their early twenties, although Eugenio Benevides of La Jolla enlisted at age twelve and was honorably discharged at the ripe old age of fifteen. His height of four feet seven inches apparently was overlooked because frequently "able-bodied men of Mexican birth" were rejected by recruiters because they were under the regulation five feet three inches.²⁷

As soldiers, native New Mexicans experienced a multitude of frustrations after joining the volunteers. First, English was the language of the military and although care was taken to appoint Spanish-speaking officers to Hispanic units, confusion was inevitable in a force that was not totally bilingual.²⁸ Second, ethnic jealousies surfaced; Hispanic officers resented the chauvinism of their Anglo counterparts. One Anglo captain recommended two Hispanos for promotion by stating that "they are without any exception the two best and cleanest Mexican soldiers I ever seen."²⁹ Canby and other high-ranking officers, however, made sure that large numbers of Hispanos received appointments as officers and promotions in military rank, but their solicitude resulted primarily from a desire to increase enlistments among the Hispanic population.³⁰

Potential frustrations centered on the care and disposition of enlisted men's families. Although some received rations at cost, others had difficulty securing government subsistence. In addition, families of militiamen from the small village of Alamosa—below Fort Craig and in the line of the Texas advance—were relocated north of the fort and forced to subsist on the generosity of neighboring villagers. And in at least one case, the laundress-wife of a Hispanic soldier was ordered off her husband's post since the couple lacked proof of marriage.³¹

One major source of dissatisfaction crippling morale prior to the battle of Valverde concerned plans to transform cavalry units into foot soldiers. Cavalry enlistees provided their own horses, and although the government promised forage and forty cents per day for the "use and risk" of their animals, a number of Hispanic officers protested that the government had failed to provide forage. They feared that the army would purchase the horses at below cost when their units were transformed into infantry, and they warned that desertions would be numerous if this policy were carried out.³²

Canby's inability to pay the volunteers on a regular basis caused the most damaging blow to military discipline and morale. In January 1862 news that the paymaster had been detained at Fort Leavenworth and would not arrive in the territory until spring caused two companies of Hispanic volunteers to revolt near Socorro and one militia company to refuse guard duty at Fort Union. Although the revolts were speedily suppressed, at least thirty of the Socorro mutineers deserted and fled to the mountains.³³

Additional frustrations undoubtedly resulted from poor training and inferior equipment furnished the volunteers. Upon enlistment, companies of the first regiment assembled for instruction at Fort Union, but instead of drilling, the men were employed day and night on fortifications or were detailed to repair roads between that post and nearby towns.³⁴ Although Canby reported in December 1861 that the volunteers were improving in discipline and instruction, he admitted that they were imperfectly equipped and armed with inferior weapons. To save the expense of ammunition, the chief ordnance officer recommended that "Mexican" volunteers be armed with lances.³⁵

Want of money, munitions, and supplies of all kinds crippled Canby's efforts to organize the volunteers, but conditions in the territory became even more critical with the arrival of General Henry Hopkins Sibley in mid-December 1861 at the head of three regiments of Texas-Confederate soldiers. Rebel movement into the interior of New Mexico toward Fort Craig, one hundred miles south of Albuquerque, rekindled efforts by Canby and civil authorities to recruit volunteers, organize the militia, and collect supplies from the surrounding countryside. Captains of local militia units contracted sizeable debts to outfit and care for their men. Captain Juan de Jesús Martines expended nearly six hundred dollars, for example, on food, lodging, fuel, equipment, and transportation for his company, while a second captain paid out over one hundred dollars for camp equipage (tin cups, plates, mess pans, etc.), \$182 for subsistence, plus additional amounts for fuel and forage.³⁶

To insure adequate supplies, citizens were ordered to place their riding animals, arms, and ammunition at the disposal of militia officers who also were authorized to purchase or take by force provisions to subsist their men. People living near Belen, however, disliked the confiscation procedures of the militia. They complained that militia officers went into many poor peoples' homes and took their last "mouthful of flour" while wealthy residents were bypassed. The regular Union army also issued orders to seize supplies if local New Mexicans refused to sell. In this way, the army could establish its own price scale as the following instructions issued at Fort Craig illustrate: "If the people of Paraja have corn for sale, they must supply your camp, and if they refuse to do so or ask more than three dollars a fanega, you are directed to take the corn, giving receipts for the amounts."³⁷

Thereafter, scores of New Mexico residents furnished food and other supplies to the militia companies converging on Fort Craig in the early months of 1862. Typical of claims later submitted against the government was one sent in by Jesús María Pacheco of Taos County who stated that in January and February of 1862 he provided a militia company with one hundred twenty pounds of buffalo meat, two sacks of flour, ten pounds of sugar, ten pounds of coffee, two fanegas of corn, some candles, and one rifle, amounting to one hundred fifty-two dollars in value.³⁸

As the Confederates advanced up the Rio Grande, Canby's greatest trouble continued to be lack of funds to finance military operations. New Mexico residents were suspicious of government-issued certificates of indebtedness and demanded gold and silver for military purchases.³⁹ Canby made one unsuccessful attempt to borrow money for the government in the fall 1861; a later attempt partially succeeded but only after Canby and his officers promised high interest rates for all loans. The details surrounding these loans are unclear, but it is evident that Canby requested citizens to furnish monthly installments of specie for use by the Union government. In November, Ferdinand Maxwell, Ceran St. Vrain, and other residents of Taos reported their inability to comply with this request. Apparently, the only citizens who turned money over to the quartermaster at this time were Romaldo Baca and Miguel Romero, each of whom furnished three hundred dollars, and Francisco Lopez and Trinidad Romero, who each furnished one hundred dollars.⁴⁰ But in the critical days following defeat at Valverde, Assistant Quartermaster John C. McFerran succeeded in borrowing from the richer Hispanos nineteen thousand dollars in specie, a sum greatly needed by Canby to purchase supplies for men in the field.⁴¹

As Sibley's men approached Fort Craig in mid-February, Canby believed that the fort could be held. He urged Governor Connelly to leave Santa Fe and join him to aid in rallying the people. Connelly anticipated raising one thousand citizen-soldiers—"the yeomanry of the country"—en route to Fort Craig, although apparently neither Canby nor Connelly expected to use these hastily enrolled militia in actual combat.⁴² Nonetheless, Union officers employed brutal techniques in this critical hour—if a Confederate diarist can be relied upon—to rouse the populace to arms. One native New Mexican recounted to invading Texans his trials with federal troops who bayoneted him and forced him to join the march to Fort Craig. "He told us that there was many a man sick that they had forced into the service but that no one was allowed to stop or rest but men forced along by the federals." Manuel Armijo, one of the wealthiest Hispanic merchants in New Mexico who subsequently aided the Confederate cause, also had been pressed into the militia and was "compulsorily present in the action at Valverde."⁴³

Confederate and Union soldiers engaged in the first major battle in New Mexico at Valverde ford, six miles above Fort Craig, on February 21, 1862. Sibley's force consisted of about 2,500 men, while Canby reportedly had 3,810 men under arms. After a day's fierce battle, the Confederates claimed victory as Union forces retreated behind the walls of Fort Craig. Canby later attributed his defeat to "the refusal of one of the volunteer regiments to cross the river" and assist Captain Alexander McRae's battery which bore the brunt of a Confederate charge and which was finally overrun. Volunteers who formed part of McRae's support had become panic-stricken and in their confused retreat communicated their panic to the regular troops causing some to flee the battlefield. On February 22, Canby reported that large numbers of the militia and volunteers had deserted.⁴⁴

Canby's critical assessment of the New Mexico volunteers and militia was supported by members of his staff and others in high command. One week after the battle of Valverde, for example, Captain Gurden Chapin, Acting Inspector General, wrote Major General H. W. Halleck that "the militia have all run away and the New Mexican volunteers are deserting in large numbers. No dependence what ever can be placed on the natives; they are worse than worthless; they are aids to the enemy, who catch them, take their arms, and tell them to go home." Moreover, Major J. L. Donaldson, commanding the District of Santa Fe, stated that "No reliance can be placed on the New Mexican Volunteers or Militia, and I advise their being disbanded. They have a traditional fear of the Texans, and will not face them in the field."⁴⁵

Canby's explanation of the Valverde defeat has received more attention than differing interpretations. Frequently overlooked is Governor Connelly's report that McRae's battery was overrun because regular troops failed to charge the enemy as ordered. When the regulars refused to advance, the volunteers followed their example and "both retired from the field."⁴⁶ Nor do secondary sources cite the allegation of Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts that the misfortunes of the day could have been averted had Major Thomas Duncan and his regular troopers occupied and held as ordered a wooded area at the Valverde crossing.⁴⁷

The most damaging evidence against the military performance of the New Mexico volunteers and militia, however, was the large

number of desertions recorded for these units. Many deserted after the debacle of Valverde and others did so in subsequent months. Because a portion of the deserters had fled to the hills where they survived by brigandage, Canby issued General Orders No. 43 on May 7, 1862 discharging from the service all deserters from the New Mexico volunteers and militia and, in addition, offering a pardon to those who returned home and reported themselves to the *alcaldes* of their precincts.⁴⁸ By September 8, 852 men had taken advantage of this amnesty program and were officially pardoned by the military high command.⁴⁹

Desertion rates among Union troops elsewhere in the United States were also appallingly great. A major cause underlying this problem, according to one authority, "was an utter absence of a realization of the obligation incurred by enlistment and failure to impress that obligation on the mind of the soldier by firm discipline," a condition which certainly prevailed in New Mexico.⁵⁰ Also contributing to the high number of recorded desertions was the general confusion which prevailed after the defeat at Valverde. Because the number of men retreating to Fort Craig "was more than could be usefully employed," Colonel Canby ordered the militia to withdraw from the fort, detour around the enemy, and concentrate at Polvadera—there to form guerrilla parties to harass the enemy on their march up the river.⁵¹ This movement caused the militia to melt into the countryside, as many men simply returned to their homes. On March 11, Governor Connelly reported to Secretary Seward that "the militia have all dispersed, and have gone to preparing their lands for the coming harvest," while the *Santa Fe Gazette* stated that after the battle Canby simply dismissed most of the militia and they returned to their homes.⁵² Indeed, local tradition notes that after the defeat at Valverde, "all the volunteers were left to shift for themselves . . . living on birds and rabbits they killed, and on what they could beg from farm houses" as they made their way home.⁵³ It is likely that many militiamen as well as New Mexico volunteers acted in obedience to orders issued by officers to return to their homes and were not therefore deserters, as was determined to be true in the case of Captain S. Barrientes's company.⁵⁴

Failing to capture Fort Craig, Sibley's army continued its advance up the Rio Grande and in March met defeat near Santa Fe at Glorieta Pass. Union troops engaged in this battle consisted

mainly of Colorado volunteers, although a few New Mexico soldiers also saw action. But the long-neglected hero of this affair was Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chávez, an old Indian fighter from a respected New Mexico family, who led Major John M. Chivington and a detachment of Colorado soldiers over the mountains to intercept the enemy. By destroying the Confederate supply wagons, Chivington's men seriously crippled Sibley's Army of New Mexico.⁵⁵

Stripped of provisions, Sibley retreated to Albuquerque and eventually decided to evacuate New Mexico. Problems of supply had continually plagued his command. His men lived off the land on their drive north and they continued this practice as they retreated south. Sheep, cattle, hogs, corn, beans, chickens—nothing was safe from Confederate foragers, not even strings of red peppers and kegs of molasses. Toribio Romero of Los Lunas alone suffered losses which he totalled to be over four thousand dollars when Texans confiscated wheat, corn, and other edibles in addition to tobacco, wine, brandy, and twelve barrels of whiskey.⁵⁶

As Confederate soldiers reentered the Mesilla Valley, many area residents drove their cattle across the border into Mexico for safety, but Sibley's confiscations were so extensive on the American side of the Rio Grande that it was feared there would be a famine among the people. Enraged by this marauding, Hispanic residents took up arms, killing members of Confederate foraging parties and driving off their livestock.⁵⁷

The retreating Confederates left behind war-inflamed passions and the knowledge that some territorial residents—a few Hispanos and even more Anglos—had aided and supported the hated invaders. On July 14, 1862, a military tribunal meeting in Santa Fe sentenced José María Rivas to be shot to death for having served as a spy for the Confederate forces.⁵⁸ Several Hispanos were jailed by military authorities on similar charges, while others were indicted for treason in United States district courts.⁵⁹ Among the latter was Blas Lucero who went into exile in El Paso, Mexico after the Confederates were driven from the Rio Grande. No less a figure than General James H. Carleton, Canby's successor, intervened on Lucero's behalf, and the case against Lucero subsequently was dropped.⁶⁰ Indeed, most indictments for treason against territorial citizens were either quashed or nolle, although

a handful of Anglos and Hispanos stood trial for their alleged support for the Confederacy.⁶¹

As the tired and dispirited Texas troops left the territory, New Mexico's fighting strength was augmented by the arrival of 2,300 California volunteers, commanded by General James H. Carleton. For the remainder of the war, volunteer soldiers from New Mexico and California spent most of their time fighting Indians and guarding against a Confederate reinvasion. The impact of the military establishment on civilians during these years, however, was intense, frequently unpleasant, and of long duration, since New Mexico remained under martial law until guns were silenced on the east coast.

In the southern portion of the territory, army officers played a major role directing civil affairs. Carleton's men, for example, issued liquor licenses, ordered residents to repair homes and clean streets, appointed some precinct officers, and allowed military commissions to assume duties of civil courts.⁶² Male citizens living in Hispanic villages near Fort Craig were forced to labor without pay to strengthen its fortifications.⁶³

The order most detested by Hispanic residents in southern New Mexico, however, was issued by Carleton as a result of a threatened Confederate reinvasion. To prevent the enemy from subsisting off the land, Mesilla Valley residents were ordered to sell all surplus corn at three dollars per fanega—a sum considerably below contract prices. And Carleton stipulated that all grain could be taken by force if necessary. Shortly after this order was implemented, many Hispanic residents abandoned their lands and migrated into Mexico, apparently taking their surplus grain across the border.⁶⁴

Complaints registered by Hispanic residents against the military were many, but perhaps they were no louder nor more frequent than those lodged by Anglo residents. By the close of the war, New Mexico was divided into two camps; those supporting Carleton, his military regime, and his Indian program, and those opposed. Wealthy Hispanos were found in each faction.⁶⁵

The most important influence of the Civil War on the lives of many Hispanos was that it brought economic prosperity and full-time employment. The army was the largest employer in the territory. Fort Union during the war years registered four hundred

twenty-five civilian employees while an estimated nine hundred were employed in the entire Department of New Mexico.⁶⁶ A sizeable number of these positions were occupied by Hispanos, who typically were hired as teamsters, laborers, herders, laundresses, spies, and guides.

During the crisis of the Texas invasion, Hispanos and Anglos alike furnished the army with large quantities of corn, wheat, forage, and other commodities, and because the government purchased at least some of these supplies in open market, even small Hispanic farmers benefited from federal spending. Hay, for example, was purchased by the burro load in Santa Fe as well as in larger quantities.⁶⁷ Later, military contracts were subject to competitive bidding, but when speculators drove up the price of staples, the army on occasion reverted to its practice of purchasing in open market, which again benefited the small producer.⁶⁸ In addition, some Hispanos reaped enormous profits by furnishing transportation and foodstuffs to Navajo Indians held captive by the army at Bosque Redondo.⁶⁹

Certainly then the Civil War had far-reaching influences upon New Mexico and its people. It brought subtle developments which went unrecognized during the turmoil of armed conflict and military occupation. Carleton's Indian policies, for example, reinforced New Mexico's traditional political factionalism, and his energetic Indian campaigns opened new agricultural lands for settlement and development. California soldiers who arrived at the beginning of the war remained to settle in the territory, invest in its economy, marry Hispanic women, and thereby hasten Americanization.⁷⁰ During this great conflict, economic ties of *ricos* with the Union government were strengthened, and fighting on the winning side undoubtedly bolstered commitment to the American flag. But to the dismay of the *ricos*, the destruction of American slavery brought in its wake the legal end to peonage. And more importantly, the war with the *Tejanos* served to advertise the West, as soldiers and newspaper correspondents described to eastern readers possibilities for economic exploitation. The war's end brought a steady stream of Americanos looking for new opportunities which forced Hispanos to fight for continued economic and political power. As they pledged to uphold the American constitution and the laws of their adopted country, Hispanos

experienced during the Civil War years the beginnings of forces which gradually eroded the foundations of their traditional society.

NOTES

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1. Standard accounts of New Mexico during the Civil War include Ray C. Colton, *The Civil War in the Western Territories* (Norman, 1959); Martin Hardwick Hall, *Sibley's New Mexico Campaign* (Austin, 1960); William A. Keleher, *Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846-1868* (Santa Fe, 1952); and Robert M. Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue* (New York, 1967). For Hispanic military contributions for both the Confederate and Union armies in Texas, see Jerry Don Thompson, *Vaqueros in Blue and Gray* (Austin, Texas, 1977).

2. See Jack D. Forbes, "Frontiers in American History and the Role of the Frontier Historian," *Ethnohistory* 15 (1968):207.

3. United States Department of the Interior, *Eighth Census of the United States, 1860: Population* (Washington, 1864), p. 567. This estimated population also excludes the people of Arizona, who were legally a part of New Mexico in 1860.

4. See Howard Roberts Lamar, *The Far Southwest: A Territorial History, 1846-1912* (New York, 1970), pp. 83-108; Rodman W. Paul, "The Spanish-Americans in the Southwest, 1848-1900," in John G. Clark, ed., *The Frontier Challenge* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1971), p. 35.

5. James A. Howard II, "New Mexico and Arizona Territories," *Journal of the West* 16 (1977):88.

6. Rencher to Seward, April 14, May 18, 1861, Records of the Secretary of State, Record Group 59, Territorial Papers, New Mexico, National Archives Microfilm Publication T-17, roll 2 (Territorial Papers).

7. Connelly to Seward, October 26, November 17, 1861, February 5, 11, 1862, and First Annual Message of Governor Connelly, December 4, 1861, Territorial Papers.

8. Canby to Assistant Adjutant General, August 16, December 8, 1861, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series 1, 53 vols. (Washington, 1880-1901) (*Official Records*), 4:65, 78-80; Canby to Adjutant General, January 13, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:84-85.

9. Santa Fe *Weekly Gazette*, April 13, August 17, 1861.

10. Rossell to Maury, May 21, 1861, Letters Received, Department of New Mexico, Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA). Approximately one year later, a second military officer reported an at-

tempt by "Mexican" residents of Peralta to kill all "whites" in that area. Hall to Headquarters, June 18, 1862, Registers of Letters Received, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

11. Martin H. Hall, "Native Mexican Relations in Confederate Arizona, 1861-1862," *Journal of Arizona History* 8 (1967):171-72.

12. See Canby to Assistant Adjutant General, July 7, 29, August 16, September 8, 1861, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:54-69.

13. Chris Emmett, *Fort Union and the Winning of the Southwest* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1965), p. 241; Canby to Armijo, January 25, 1862, Letters Sent, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; Orders No. 10, September 13, 1861, Southern District of New Mexico, 1861-1862, RG 393, NA (So. Dist. of NM); General Orders No. 28, August 10, 1861, Dept. of NM, Records of Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, NA (RG 94).

14. Werner to Canby, August 28, 1861, LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

15. On Southern sympathizers interfering with recruiting, see Hovey to Canby, August 26, 1861 and Leftrick to Canby, December 21, 1861, LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; St. Vrain to Fremont, August 16, 1861, Regimental Papers, First Infantry, Volunteer Organizations of the Civil War, New Mexico, RG 94, NA (Vol. Org.-CW).

16. Hubbell to Canby, October 22, 1861, Regimental Papers, Capt. Santiago Hubbell's Independent Co., Vol. Org.-CW, RG 94, NA; Canby to Paymaster General, November 18, 1861, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:75. This complaint was not unique to Colonel Canby but was voiced by many commanders fighting in the eastern theatre. See Ella Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War* (repr. Gloucester, Mass., 1966), pp. 132-33.

17. In January 1862, Governor Connelly reported to Secretary Seward that New Mexico had 4,000 volunteers and militia in the service, 1,200 of whom were militia. See Connelly to Seward, January 11, 19, 1862, Territorial Papers. Jerry D. Thompson is in error when he states that by September 8, 1861 the volunteer regiments had enrolled 2,092 infantrymen and 1,632 cavalrymen. Canby reported on that date that approximately 2,100 men had enrolled in all volunteer regiments. See Canby to Governor, September 8, 1861, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:69-70; Jerry Don Thompson, "Mexican-Americans in the Civil War: The Battle of Valverde," *Texana* 10 (1972):6.

18. Santa Fe *New Mexican*, November 7, 1863, April 2, 1864; "Circular," June 25, 1864, Letters Sent, First Cavalry, Vol. Org.-CW, RG 94, NA.

19. McFerran to Donaldson, October 9, 1861, Letters Sent, Records of the Quartermaster, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA (LS, RQ, Dept. of NM).

20. "Circular," July 6, 1861, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:54; Santa Fe *New Mexican*, April 2, 1864. See also Nicodemus to Leftrick, December 29, 1861, LS, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

21. Leftrick to Canby, December 21, 1861, LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

22. Russell to [name unclear], [September 1863], Letters Sent by the Superintendent of the Recruiting Service, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA (LS, SRS). Santa Fe *New Mexican*, June 22, December 15, 1865.

23. Ralph Emerson Twitchell, *Leading Facts of New Mexico History*, 5 vols. (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912), 2:358-59; L. Bradford Prince, *A Concise History of New Mexico* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912), pp. 220-26; Rafael Chacon, Compiled Service Records, Civil War, New Mexico Volunteers, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, National Archives Publication M-427, roll 5 (Compiled Service Records).

24. Miguel Antonio Otero, *My Life on the Frontier*, 2 vols. (Albuquerque, 1939), 1:63.

25. "Proclamation by the Governor," September 9, 1861, Territorial Papers; Gilberto Espinosa and Tibo J. Chavez, *El Rio Abajo* (Portales, N.M., [1976]), pp. 108-09. The legislative assembly of New Mexico issued a manifesto which stated bluntly that the enemy was Texas and the Texans and that "every Mexican in the Territory" must rally to the cause. "Address of the Legislative Assembly of New Mexico," January 29, 1862, Territorial Papers.

26. See, for example, Santa Fe *Weekly Gazette*, September 15, 22, 29, December 15, 1860.

27. See Compiled Service Records; Eugenio Benavides, Compiled Service Records, roll 3; Selden to Fry, November 22, 1863, LS, SRS, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

28. Canby to Adjutant General, December 8, 1861, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:78. General Orders No. 44, issued May 10, 1862, brought about the reorganization of the First Regiment of New Mexico volunteers and stipulated that in the companies composed of native New Mexicans, "one or more of the officers and one-fourth of the non-commissioned officers shall be persons who understand and speak both the English and Spanish languages." General Orders No. 44, May 10, 1862, Regimental Papers, First Cavalry, Vol. Org.-CW, RG 94, NA.

29. See, for example, Emmett, *Fort Union*, pp. 250-51; Manuel Chacon, Compiled Service Records, roll 5; Ayres to Captain [name unclear], July 3, 1864, Regimental Papers, First Cavalry, Vol. Org.-CW, RG 94, NA.

30. Canby to Paul, January 15, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:85; Carleton to West, September 18, 1863 and Carleton to Connelly, September 30, 1863, Arrott Collection (New Mexico Highlands University), "Fort Union, 1863," file no. 5.

31. Chavez to Anderson, September 10, 1861, LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; Roberts to Prefects of San Antonio and Socorro, January 17, 1862, LS, So. Dist. of NM, RG 393, NA; Juan Jose Castillo, Compiled Service Records, roll 4.

32. Espinosa to Everett, February 5, 1862 and Chacon to Everett, November 27, 1861, Regimental Papers, First Infantry, Vol. Org.-CW, RG 94, NA.

33. Canby to Adjutant General, January 13, 20, 1862 and Canby to Pino, January 17, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, Vol. 4, pp. 84-87; Canby to Donaldson, January 17, 1862, LR, District of Santa Fe, RG 393, NA.

34. General Orders No. 18, July 13, 1861, Dept. of NM, RG 94, NA; Special Orders, No. 187, November 9, 1861, Dept. of NM, RG 94, NA; St. Vrain to Fremont, August 16, 1861, Regimental Papers, First Infantry, Vol. Org.-CW, RG

94, NA; McFerran to Donaldson, November 5, 1861, LS, RQ, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

35. Canby to Adjutant General, December 8, 1861, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:78-80; Shoemaker to Nicodemus, November 23, 1861, LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

36. See accounts of Juan de Jesus Martines and Felipe Sandoval, Adjutant General's Accounts, Civil War Militia, Requisitions, Invoices, State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe, New Mexico (SRCA).

37. Division Order No. 5 and Order No. 7, January 25, 1862, Annual Reports of Adjutant General, Territorial Archives of New Mexico (TA), Microfilm Edition, roll 84; Thompson to Nicodemus, February 7, 1862, LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; Roberts to Moore, November 1, 1861, LS, So. Dist. of NM, RG 393, NA. A fanega was equal to about two and one-half bushels.

38. Account of Jesus Maria Pacheco, Adjutant General's Accounts, Claims for Requisitioned Goods, 1862, SRCA.

39. McFerran to Meigs, March 4, May 9, 1863, and McFerran to Spinner, May 16, 1863, LS, RQ, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

40. Canby to Paymaster General, November 18, 1861, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:75. See Ferdinand Maxwell to Commanding General and Ceran St. Vrain to Commanding General, November 27, 1861, Registers of LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; Clerry to McFerran, December 1, 1861, McFerran to Donaldson, December 10, 1861, January 16, 1862, LS, RQ, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

41. McFerran to Meigs, April 28, 1862 and McFerran to Canby, May 3, 1862, LS, RQ, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA. The following men contributed specie:

Ambrosio Armijo	Albuquerque
Salvador Armijo	Albuquerque
Nestor Armijo	Los Ranchos de Albuquerque
Tomas Gonzales	Albuquerque
Antonio Lerma	Alameda
Juan Pedro Perea	Bernalillo
Julian Perea	Bernalillo
Jose Leander Perea	Bernalillo
Manuel Antonio Otero	Peralta

42. Connelly to Seward, January 19, 23, February 11, 1862, Territorial Papers. As late as January 7, 1862, Canby planned to use the militia only to replace regular troops drawn from posts that were not threatened by the enemy. See Canby to Paul, January 7, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 4:83-84.

43. Diary of Alfred B. Peticolas, pp. 20-21 (typescript courtesy of Dr. John Wilson, Las Cruces, New Mexico); Sibley to Cooper, May 4, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:506-12.

44. Canby to Adjutant General, February 22, March 1, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:487-93. Connelly, reporting from Fort Craig in February, stated that the Union forces numbered 4,000, with 1,200 being regular troops. Connelly to Seward, February 11, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:644. On

Sibley's command, see Martin H. Hall, *The Confederate Army of New Mexico* (Austin, Texas, 1978), p. 23.

45. Chapin to Halleck, February 28, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:634-35. Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:635-36.

46. Connelly to Seward, March 1, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:637-40.

47. Roberts to Nicodemus, February 23, 1862 and Roberts to Duncan, March 8, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:493-97, 501-02.

48. *Santa Fe Weekly Gazette*, May 17, 1862; General Orders No. 43, May 7, 1862, Dept. of NM, RG 94, NA.

49. Special Orders No. 101, June 13, 1862 and General Orders No. 80, September 8, 1862, Dept. of NM, RG 94, NA.

50. Lonn, *Desertion*, p. 134.

51. Connelly to Seward, March 1, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:637-40; Hovey to Pino, February 23, 1862, TA, roll 84.

52. Connelly to Seward, March 11, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:645; *Santa Fe Weekly Gazette*, April 26, 1862, May 9, 1863.

53. Espinosa and Chavez, *El Rio Abajo*, p. 174.

54. Special Orders No. 101, June 13, 1862, Dept. of NM, RG 94, NA. Still, others plainly deserted their posts; Francisco Perea reported, for example, that when news reached Albuquerque of the Texans' success in bypassing Fort Craig, many militiamen in that town left with their arms in the dead of night. Perea to Canby, July 9, 1862, Regimental Papers, Perea's Battalion Militia, Vol. Org.-CW, RG 94, NA.

55. Marc Simmons, *The Little Lion of the Southwest, A Life of Manuel Antonio Chaves* (Chicago, 1973), pp. 182-86.

56. Account of Losses Sustained by Toribio Romero, April 1862 (and numerous other accounts), Records of the Adjutant General, SRCA.

57. Howe to Chapin, August 5, 1862, LS, So. Dist. of NM, RG 393, NA; Inclosure No. 2 in Canby to Adjutant General, June 21, 1862, Carleton to Drum, July 22, 1862, Steele to Cooper, July 12, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 9:676-78, 554-55, 721-22.

58. General Orders No. 174, October 30, 1862, *Official Records*, Series II, 4:669. President Abraham Lincoln subsequently overturned this sentence, judging that Rivas had merely served as a Confederate scout rather than as a true spy.

59. See, for example, "Carson Report," May 13, 1862, LR, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; Edward D. Tittman, "The Exploitation of Treason," *New Mexico Historical Review* 4 (1929):128-45.

60. Carleton to Lucero, January 6, 1863 and Carleton to Hubbell, January 13, 1863, Arrott Collection, "Fort Union, 1863," file no. 1; Albuquerque *Rio Abajo Press*, February 17, 1863.

61. See, for example, *Rio Abajo Press*, February 10, 1863.

62. General Orders No. 15, August 14, 1862 and Special Orders No. 37, September 8, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 50, pt. 2: 65, 105-06; *Santa Fe New Mexican*, March 16, June 22, July 28, 1865, July 21, 1866.

63. See Special Orders No. 1, January 1, 1863, Arrott Collection, "Fort Union, 1863," file no. 1; "Circular," February 3, 1863 and "Circular," February 11, 1863, Orders, So. Dist. of NM, RG 393, NA; A.A.A.G. to Alcalde of La Jollita, February 16, 1863, So. Dist. of NM, RG 393, NA.

64. Carleton to West, November 18, 1862, *Official Records*, Series I, 15:599-601; West to Cutler, September 23, 1862 and General Orders No. 24, December 2, 1862, *Official Records*, 50, pt. 2: 132-33, 239-40; Santa Fe *New Mexican*, June 22, 1865; Testimony of Henry Cuniffe, December 21, 1863 in the case of Brigadier General J. R. West, LR, Office of the Adjutant General, RG 94, National Archives Microfilm Publication M-619, roll 283. Corn also was ordered seized in small towns around Fort Union during the threatened re-invasion. McFerran to Craig, January 30, 1863, LS, RQ, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

65. Local Santa Fe newspapers provide a running commentary on political divisions within the territory and public reaction to Carleton and his military program.

66. McFerran to Garrison, December 28, 1863, LS, RQ, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; Enos to McMullen, August 1, 1864, Arrott Collection, "Fort Union, 1863," file no. 5.

67. See, for example, Nicodemus to Otero, January 19, 1862 and Nicodemus to Chávez, April 28, 1862, LS, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; "Purchases During Month of June, 1862," Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 2, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA.

68. See McFerran to Archer, November 28, 1863, Enos to Higdon, April 9, 1864, Carey to McCabe, October 20, 1865, LS, RQ, Dept. of NM, RG 393, NA; Santa Fe *Weekly Gazette*, January 9, 1864; Albuquerque *New Mexico Press*, July 26, 1864.

69. "Board of Inquiry," June 25, 1864, voucher signed by Antonio Jose Luna, Papers relating to Commissary stores issued Navajos, LR, Office of Adjutant General, RG 94, National Archives Microfilm Publication M-619, roll 286; see abstracts of money expended for Navajos, 1864-1865, "Condition of the Indian Tribes," 39 Cong., 2d Sess., *Senate Report No. 156*, 1867 (serial 1279), pp. 276, 289-92, 297.

70. See Darlis A. Miller, "A Civil War Legacy: Californians in New Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1977) and "Carleton's California Column: A Chapter in New Mexico's Mining History," *New Mexico Historical Review* 53 (1978):5-38.